I write here about some modern neuropsychological evidence that can be brought full turn into relationship with Jackson's own percipient views on levels of organization, advanced by him so influentially. For the past 20 years or so, neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience have been otherwise occupied -with discovering and analysing dissociations between systems or sub-systems: for example, the different modes of processing in dyslexia, such as word-form vs phonemic modes; or the different memory systems, such as short-term, episodic, semantic; or specific categories of agnosia; or multiple visual systems; and so forth'. From such evidence a very rich harvest has been reaped of what we might call 'vertical dissociations', ie between vertically organized systems or modules. But in the past few years there has been something of an epidemic of discoveries of horizontal dissociations between levels, and it is some of these that I wish to discuss here. All of them concern dissociations between intact function and acknowledged awareness of such function. Some of these discoveries, as we shall see, exemplify Jackson's views about hierarchical organization, and some do not.
Blindsight
I start with what might be the most surprismg and counter-intuitive example -namely stimulus detection in the absence of awareness. Actually, there is an already familiar example of such a dissociation which reflects, literally, a disconnexion of levels, namely the preservation of spinal reflexes in paraplegia, in which there can be a vigorous response to stimuli that are not felt as such. In Sherrington's magisterial language, 'A needle-prick causes invariably the drawing up of the limb ... The nervous arcs of pain-nerves, broadly speaking, dominate the spinal centres ... where pain is, ofcourse non-existent.' (italics addedj'. This example is usually not thought to be surprising, because it is assumed to be a disconnexion of the spine from the brain, which is the organ of conscious sensation. But there is already a paradox: neurones are neurones, full stop. Why should the collection of neurones in the spinal column not suffice for awareness, whereas other collections of neurones, in the brain, do? (Indeed, some 19th century physiologists did declare the isolated frog spinal cord to be conscious.)
A more direct approach to the question is to consider disconnexions within to the brain itself, which is what I shall do for the rest of the lecture. The best studied example of such a dissociation of detection and awareness is 'blindsight'v'. Occipital lesions in man, typically, cause field defects which are blind to the patient. This is surprising in its own right, for two reasons. The first is that in other primates striate cortex lesions still allow a range of visual discriminations to occur, albeit changed quantitatively and qualitatively. The second is that the pathway to the striate cortex via the lateral geniculate nucleus is but one of 10 pathways from the retina to targets in the brain. Admittedly the geniculate-striate pathway is the largest, but the non-striate pathways taken together are 5 times larger than the whole of the auditory nerve -not a trivial capacity.
We normally test human subjects by asking them what they 'see'. Even ifthis is not explicit, it is usually implicit. Of course, we cannot do that with an animalwe must use forced-choice discriminations in which a particular response to a particular stimulus leads to a particular outcome. Surprisingly, when this same approach was used with human subjects, as Warrington, Marshall and Sanders and I did in 1974 5 , in some of them at least they could make discriminative responses like those of monkeys with striate cortex lesions. But, and here was the surprise, they said that they did not 'see' the stimuli. They thought they were guessing, or under certain restricted conditions had a gut-feeling and 'knew' that stimuli were present, but it was not visual, not 'seeing'. Hence, their field defects were blind experientially, but not visually disconnected.
Several examples of ,blindsight' are available (cfrefs 3 and 4 for reviews). Some subjects generate a saccade (first reported by Poppel et at. in 1974)5 or point" to the location of randomly placed flashes. Discrimination of orientation in the frontal plane have also been found. Visual acuity can be assessed by varying the spacing of gratings which are discriminated from homogeneous equal-energy patches. Differential responses to direction of movement has also been studied. A threshold of detection qua detection, can be measured. Perhaps the most remarkable recent evidence concerns the measurement of detection thresholds by Stoerig and Cowey? to determine spectral sensitivity and wavelength discrimination, together with evidence for opponent process colour discrimination in some subjects, in the total absence of any acknowledged experience of the stimuli", Anatomical and physiological evidence is available to permit reasonable hypotheses about just which visual attributes will be detectableb". Neurones in V4 are primarily sensitive to wavelength. Those in MT, or V5, on the other hand are primarily sensitive to movement. Both of these areas have retinal inputs that by-pass striate cortex, and we know that the neurones in MT continue to show the same response properties even with total removal of VI -striate cortex -in the monkey. Hence, it is becoming clear why some subjects but not others might be sensitive to wavelength differences, and others to direction of movement.
Vision is by far the most thoroughly studied sensory system in this regard, but reports of 'blind touch'I'' and also of 'deaf hearing"! have also appeared in association with relevant cortical lesions. Much remains to be done in all modalities, including vision, but research should be helped by the devising of testing methods that are less tedious than administering the thousands of forced-choice trials in which a subject is required to guess about nonexperienced stimuli to determine psychophysical limits of capacity. The general strategy with these newer methods bypasses any need whatever to ask the subject what he sees, in blindsight, for example, to measure how stimuli in the blind field modulate or interact with responses to seen stimuli in the intact field. I have reviewed the area alsewhere", but a recent paper to appear in Science by Rafal and colleagues'f provides a nice illustration. Their subjects were simply instructed to saccade as qucikly as possible to an eccentrically-located stimulus. What Rafal et al. demonstrated was that an 'unseen' stimulus presented to the blind temporal hemi-field of he mianopic subjects 0-50 ms prior to a stimulus to the intact field inhibited the latency of a saccade to the seen stimulus in the intact field. (The bias favouring the temporal hemi-field was predicted from the stronger crossed projection of the optic nerve to the superior colliculus.) An earlier study by Marzi and colleagues-" used the same approach but with reaction times to key press rather than saccade latency. In such examples, the subject never need be asked to guess about the unseen stimuli -the effect is measured directly by its effect on the response to seen stimuli. Such methods also allow comparative studies to be carried out on animals or young children. Another alternative is to use autonomic responses such as galvanic skin response to unseen stimuli in the blind field -and here the pupillary response is turning out to be of potential great value.
To turn to a higher level of control of detection: as the 'search-light of attention' focuses upon different parts of the visual scene, some regions are highlighted and others ignored. An extreme form of bias in attention is seen in parietal lobe lesions, typically right hemisphere, causing unilateral left-sided hemineglect. By definition this must be neglect rather than hemi-blindness because it can occur in the presence offull visual fields. A recent rather graphic example of detection in the neglected field given by Marshall and Halligan'< appeared in Nature, labelled as an example of 'blindsight in visuo-spatial neglect'. The neglect patient was asked to make a same-different judgement between two simultaneously presented pictures, one of a house, the other of the same house but with its left side in flames. As the left side was neglected, the subject consistently responded 'same'. But when then asked to select the house she would prefer to live in, she chose the non-inflamed one over the other, at a high level of statistical significance, but remarking that it was a silly question as the two were identical.
Aphasia
On encountering phenomena of detection without acknowledged awareness, it is natural to consider Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 84 August 1991 467 them to be a kind of disconnexion syndrome in which stimulus reception is somehow disconnected from verbal encoding or communicating, and to think of superficially similar phenomena reported for the right hemisphere of 'split-brain' patients -in other words, to consider the problem not one of detection as such, but of processing at a later stage. Such an interpretation, in fact, in terms of faulty access to verbal processing, will not work for 'blindsight', for reasons spelled out elsewhere", But even within the dominant left hemisphere itself, and with that capacity which is usually reckoned to be the most highly developed and the uniquely human sill, namely, linguistic comprehension, a dissociation can be found between covert and overt processing. A study by Lorraine Tyler at Cambridge-t provides a striking example. She studied a Wernicke's aphasic patient, who had a severe impairment of verbal comprehension. In formal language tests, such as matching a sentence to a picture, or in the Token test, he was no better than at chance. Tyler showed that nevertheless the patient was normally sensitive to the nuances of the English language. One way she demonstrated this was to instruct the subject to respond as quickly as possible to a particular target word in English. She then buried this word in correct or degraded sentences. The degradation could be either to the semantics or the syntax or to the 'pragmatic' appropriateness of the sentence. The key comes from the fact that normal subject spot a target word faster when it is in a normal linguistic structure than when it is anomalous. And so does the aphasic patient. He is somewhat slower, not surprisingly than controls, but his pattern of reactions times is very similar.
Other variations of the same theme were carried out by Tyler, with comparable results: the reactions reflected the semantic and syntactic structure, even though the subject was at chance in identifying whether a sentence as 'correct' or not.
Thus, in the realms of detection, attention, and verbal processing, we can find neuropsychological evidence of intact processing together with a failure of awareness or comprehension of that processing or of its results. But it is perhaps in the field of memory that the oldest and most numerous researches can be found.
Amnesia
The amnesic syndrome refers to patients who apparently cannot remember experiences from minute to minute: they have severe anterograde amnesia. The causes are varied -bilateral temporal lobe surgery, herpes simplex encephalitis, alcohol, carbon monoxideall acting upon a system of limbic lobe brain structures that are currently under intense scrutiny by anatomists, pathologists, physiologists, and neuropsychologists. The patients' immediate memory are typically normal, for example in reciting back strings of digits or in performing more formal shortterm memory tests. They can solve problems if these do not require bridging an interval of time. There need be no loss of cognitive and perceptual capacities or well-established verbal or other skills. Their vocabularies are intact, and their IQs can be quite normal. But the anterograde amnesia is severe and crippling, reflected in failure of recognition of an experience after an interval of a minute or so, but also with some considerable retrograde amnesia for events prior to the brain damage.
Over the past 20 years a remarkable set of findings have been produced-", It gradually has become clear that these patients are very well capable of learning a large variety of new tasks, and they retain them over very long times -weeks, or even months -and often as well as normal persons. This first became clear from studies of motor skill learning, such as sustained performance of tracking tasks or mirror drawing-? even though the patients deny having any memory for the tasks on each new occasion. But even with verbal material they can be shown to have good retentive powers. For example, in a series of experiments by Professor Warrington and me at the National Hospital initiated more than 20 years ago, we showed amnesic patients long lists of words. A few minutes later the subjects firmly denied having any memory for any of the words, and were at chance in a test of forced-choice recognition of them. But if we showed them the first few letters of the words, or fragmented versions of the words, and simply asked them to guess what words they stood for, they were greatly helped by having seen the word in a list before. Needless to say, they were not helped if the word had not been in the list. The same technique can be used with pictures. With it one can study learning and forgetting in a systematic way18. A large number of variations have now been produced, all of which show intact learning and retention by such patients. The general phenomenon is called 'priming', and is practically a research industry both with patients and with normal subjects in experimental psychology.
Other examples can be found in perceptual learning!", eg for specific jigsaw puzzles. The meaning of anomalous sentences-? or pictures'" can be acquired and retained. New associations can be established by classicial conditioning-s, as can the applications of rules to paired-associate learning-s or arithmetic-", Despite all of these examples of good learning and retention, the only person who remains unconvinced that they occur is the amnesic patient. The newly stored items do not have the quality of being 'remembered'. You may have noticed that all of the sensitive tasks are carried out in such a way that it is not necessary to ask the patient whether he remembers -instead one just presents the relevant stimulus and asks for the relevant response. The amnesic patient does not remember if he is asked to remember. He literally loses the experience of remembering, as such.
Agnosia
There is another memory system that does not carry this quality of experience, as such: it is for the vast store of knowledge that we all possess -a capacity that is sometimes called semantic memory. Neurological disturbances also occur to categories or items of acquired knowledge, constituting the various types of agnosias. Such patients do not lose the experience of memory as such, instead they lose the meaning in relevant categories. Indeed, they can readily recall a previous occasion when they were equally unable to identify the meaning of the same object.
Here, too, in this type of memory disturbance, a dissociation can be found between the agnosic explicit loss of meaning and an intact level of processing that is covert and unavailable to the patient's awareness. Prosopagnosia, an agnosia for familiar faces, is an area in which research has been especially focused.
It has been shown, for example, by Bauer 25 and Tranel and Damasio'" that at least some prosopagnosic patients have an electrical skin conductance response to familiar faces that is different from that to unfamiliar faces. That is, even if the patient cannot recognize familiar faces, his autonomic nervous system can. But it is not only the autonomic system that is privy to such knowledge. More surprisingly, as shown by Young and his colleagues, if the patients are asked to make judgements about the professions of well-known persons' faces or, for example, to learn names that go with the faces, they are slower to learn name-face or profession-face pairings when the name or profession is incorrectly paired with a familiar face than when it is correctly paired with it, even though they display no recognition of the familiar faces -all seem equally unfamiliar to them'". Some part of them 'knows' the familiar face.
Dissociation, fractionation, and levels of organization And so, in every major realm ofcognitive achievementperception, recognition memory and recall, language, problem solving, meaning, motor skill learningrobust hidden processes can be found that are relatively immune to neurological brain dysfunction. There are striking dissociations between what can be processed and what aspect of that process is available to awareness. The strength and duration of these covert reactions can be equal to those shown by normal control subjects -they are not just pale Humean images. A related but opposite condition also exists: there can be an excess of awareness in relation to reality in the condition of anosagnosia, when patients deny their loss of function, eg blindness or loss of tactile sensitivity. Even here there have been claims of covert non-deniaI28. The evidence from neuropsychology has also stimulated research for similar dissociations in normal functioning, for which there is now a large literature but about which I am going to say nothing here.
My examples of disconnected awareness from intact function are by no means exhaustive -there are also reports in dyslexia" and other agnosic states 28 -and the research epidemiology is so vigorous that I suspect that there will probably be no cognitive neuropsychological dysfunction that will be immune. But are all of these logically the same type of dissociation? The answer appears to be no. In an anatomical arrangement such as that underlying blindsight, where we have a number of parallel and independent pathways from the retina into the cerebrum, it is reasonable to analyse the outcome in terms of fractionation. Where one finds double dissociations of function, with convergent evidence of independent pathways, one has both a necessary and a sound basis for inferring independent components or biases. Warrington and I found just this type of double dissociation in a blindsight patient", The blindsight field was more biased towards detection than the intact 'seeing' field, and just the opposite bias for form discrimination. In that sense, the evidence was consistent with earlier theories of 'two visual systems', the geniculo-striate for identification and the midbrain system for detection and orientation. Even beyond the striate cortex, we have multiple and parallel outputs, and so independent components of vision are becoming clear, eg movement and form, together with mutually independent varieties of blindsight. Similarly, in the area of memory disorders, it is often considered that brain damage can cause a fractionation into functionally different memory systems, eg declarative vs procedural, short-term vs long-term, episodic vs semantic, and so forth, some of which are accompanied by awareness, and others of which are not.
Varieties of fractionation cannot be easily accommodated in a Jacksonian hierarchy of levels. But some of the other examples I have cited appear to fit such a scheme quite easily and compellingly. The logical requirement for the Jacksonian view is a single, rather than a double dissociation. That is, the higher level can be disrupted without disrupting the lower but not vice versa. The evidence from aphasia almost certainly follows that pattern. It would be difficult to consider an outcome such that implicit processing of grammar and semantics would be damaged without the explicit operation also being damaged, although as we have seen from Tyler's work, the opposite can and does occur. Jackson's view of the structure of the hierarchy ascending from the most automatic and most tightly organized to the voluntary and loosely organized maps onto that situation well. Indeed, his description of the outcome in aphasia, 'as the loss of the most voluntary service or words, with a persistence of a more automatic service of words' is close to Tyler's own account, although her results elevate semantics and syntactical structure to the service of the 'automatic'. (Indeed, we all know that elaborate ritualistic verbal exchanges occur that are wholly automatic and often unconscious.)
Some implications
Leaving taxonomic questions aside, are there any general implications that emerge from the body of research taken as a whole? One implication is obvious: the profile and severity of dysfunction, in one sense, cannot be judged from verbal intercourse with a patient alone, including formal tests or procedures that themselves are simply translations of putative explicit verbal exchanges into test scores. So long as the patient is asked to respond when he 'sees', residual blindsight evidence will not be found. Similarly tests of memory based on recognition or recall, no matter how elegantly constructed will never reveal powerful but hidden retention based on priming. The conventional clinical interview, of course, will fall very far short. Unfortunately, alternative procedures for expanding the profile to include covert as well as overt function are sometimes tedious, but procedures are evolving that will make that task easier.
Another practical implication might also follow, although it is still early days: therapy might be based on building upon covert residual function. We already know that visual field defects in the monkey can be made to shrink significantly with particular methods of specialized training that 'push' the extra-striate pathways. Application of the same methods to hemianopia human has led to claims of a similar modest expansion of intact fields. Similarly, some researchers are trying to teach new verbal associations to severely amnesic patients, using priming methodology.
If therapy based on covert processing turns out to be practicable, it carries its own paradox: it is that patients cannot live on implicit processing alone. The amnesic patient is severely crippled and requires Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine Volume 84 August 1991 469 permanent custodial care, despite a rich crop of retained facilitations induced through priming. The prosopagnosic patient may show a healthy galvanic skin response to a familiar face, but he will be deeply embarrassed by the inability in everyday life to recognize the face of his spouse or close friends until they speak. The blindsight patient will fail to identify or see objects and bump into them in his hemianopic field. The aphasic patient will not be helped in his comprehension or communication by virtue of intact sensitivity, at a lower level, to syntax and semantics. And so forth. In short, none of these patients can think or imagine in the terms or on the basis of the processes of which they are unaware, and they all suffer severe handicaps as a result. If therapy is to occur, it must build upon, but emerge from the level of implicit processing to one that allows explicit awareness of residual function to occur. How to do so is the challenge.
Finally, of course, there are theoretical and philosophical implications concerning the neurological basis of awareness, in some ways the most challenging-". Jackson uncompromisingly endorsed a dualistic position that was commonly held in his time, ofpsychophysical parallelism. This now sits very uncomfortably with the evidence I have cited, although it cannot be refuted by evidence alone. But, philosophy aside, the more abiding message from Jackson concerned the organization of the nervous system, cast in terms of hierarchical levels of increasing complexity but decreasing strength. Perhaps such a seminal hierarchical approach in terms of levels of covert and overt processing can now also be put to the service of the neurology of awareness itself.
